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Capital equipment – such as computers and industrial machinery – embodies skill-biased technology,
in the sense that it is complementary to skilled labor. Most countries import a large share of their capital
equipment, and by doing so import skill-biased technology. In this paper we develop a tractable quantitative
model of international trade in capital goods to quantify the extent to which trade, through capital-skill
complementarity, raises the relative demand for skill and hence increases the skill premium. In one
counterfactual, we find that moving from the trade levels observed in the year 2000 to autarky would
decrease the skill premium by 16% in the median country in our sample, by 5% in the US, and by
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Capital equipment–such as computers and industrial machinery–embodies skill-biased
technology, in the sense that it is complementary to skilled labor.1 It is also highly traded,
with production concentrated among a small group of countries; see e.g. Eaton and Kortum
(2001).2 Many countries import a large share of their capital equipment,3 and by doing
so import skill-biased technology. In this paper we develop a model of international trade
and capital-skill complementarity to quantify the extent to which trade raises the relative
demand for skill, and hence increases the skill premium (the wage of skilled labor relative to
unskilled labor) in a range of countries.
We use a multi-country Ricardian model–following Eaton and Kortum (2002) (hence-
forth EK)–extended to allow for capital-skill complementarity–following Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) (henceforth KORV).4 With capital-skill complementarity, an
increase in the stock of capital equipment tends to raise the demand for skilled relative to
unskilled labor. With international trade, the aggregate stock of capital equipment in one
country depends on all foreign productivities and labor endowments, and on the trade costs
between every pair of countries. We show, however, that changes in trade costs, foreign
productivities, and foreign labor endowments aﬀect a country’s steady-state stock of capital
equipment only through changes in its domestic sectoral expenditure shares, i.e., the share
of its sectoral absorption that is produced domestically.5 Hence, steady-state changes in a
country’s skill premium are determined by changes in its domestic expenditure share in each
sector, domestic productivity in each sector, and domestic labor endowments.
Using this insight, we oﬀer a simple analytic expression for the steady-state change in the
skill premium, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, which makes transparent the qualitative and
quantitative eﬀects on the skill premium of changing trade patterns, domestic productivities,
and domestic labor endowments. Three parameters are key in shaping the mapping from
1Since Griliches (1969), various empirical papers provide support for this hypothesis; see e.g. Katz and
Autor (1999), who summarize the literature documenting a positive correlation between the use of computer-
based technologies and employment of skilled labor within industries, ﬁrms, and plants.
2For example, 80% of the world’s capital equipment production occurred in just eight countries in the
year 2000: the U.S., Japan, Germany, China, France, Korea, the U.K., and Italy. Source: Unido Industrial
Statistics.
3For example, the share of domestic absorption imported from abroad in the equipment sector in the year
2000 was 73% in the U.K., 81% in Australia, 84% in Chile, and 96% in Cameroon. Source: our calculation
using trade data from Feenstra et. al. (2005) and Unido Industrial Statistics.
4See e.g. Polgreen and Silos (2008) and Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2010) for other macroeconomic
applications of capital-skill complementarity.
5Here, we apply the insight of EK and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (Forthcoming), who
show that–across a wide range of workhorse frameworks–the impact on domestic welfare (i.e. the stock
of domestic consumption) of foreign technological change and changes in trade costs are trasmitted only
through changes in domestic expenditure shares.
1changes in the pattern and volume of international trade to changes in the skill premium:
the dispersion of productivities within sectors, which determines the elasticity of trade with
respect to trade costs, and two production function elasticities, which together determine the
extent of capital-skill complementarity and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor. While the dispersion of productivities within sectors is a standard parameter
in Ricardian models of trade, the production function elasticities are not. Hence, we pursue
several strategies to parameterize these using structural equations delivered by the model.
We both calibrate and estimate these elasticities using US data on changes between 1963
and 2000 in factor shares and factor supplies, in each case ﬁnding a signiﬁcant degree of
capital-skill complementarity. In order to assess the degree of capital-skill complementarity
in a developing country that is a net importer of capital equipment, we also estimate the
elasticities using Chilean data between 1974 and 2000 and obtain very similar results.
We use our parameterized model to quantify the impact of changing trade ﬂows on the
skill premium through capital-skill complementarity. We conduct two counterfactuals. In
the ﬁrst, we determine how much each country’s skill premium would change if it were moved
to autarky. In the second, we determine the impact of changes in observed trade ﬂows on
each country’s skill premium. Through these counterfactuals, we are interested in addressing
the extent to which countries may import a rise in the skill premium. We are not directly
concerned with whether a change in trade patterns is driven by changing technologies, labor
endowments, or trade costs.
These counterfactuals exploit the simple structure of our model, which allows us to
conduct these exercises country-by-country because the impact of changes in any foreign
technology, foreign labor endowment, or any trade cost is transmitted only through changes
in domestic expenditure shares. By taking changes in trade ﬂo w sa sg i v e n ,w ea r ea b l e
to conduct each counterfactual without actually computing the model’s full multi-country
general equilibrium. We ﬁnd that international trade plays an important role in shaping
the skill premium, but that its importance varies widely across countries in our sample. For
example, moving from the trade levels observed in the year 2000 to autarky would imply a
decrease in the skill premium of 16% for the median country in our sample. The decrease is
relatively small in the US (5%), which has a comparative advantage in capital equipment,
and is much larger in countries that rely heavily on imports for their capital equipment,
including developed countries such as Canada (25%) and developing countries such as Chile
(20%). In addition, observed changes in trade ﬂows over the last few decades generate large
increases in the skill premium in various countries, especially those with a large increase
in equipment imports. For instance, we ﬁnd that if the UK and Canada return to their
1963 trade levels, the skill premium in these countries would decrease by 13% and 19%
2respectively. On the other hand, in the US the counterfactual decrease in the skill premium
would be only 5%.
Our paper builds on a growing literature empirically documenting the impact of inter-
national trade on technological change–see e.g. Pavcnik (2002), De Loeker (2010), Lileeva
and Treﬂer (2010), and Bustos (2011a)–and on the skill intensity of production–see e.g.
Verhoogen (2008), Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011), Bustos (2011b), and Koren and
Csillag (2011)–using detailed ﬁrm, plant, and sector-level data. These papers provide em-
pirical support for the hypothesis that international trade can generate skill-biased techno-
logical change, as posited by, e.g., Acemoglu (2003), Thoenig and Verdier (2003), and Yeaple
(2005). While some of these empirical papers study the implications for the skill intensity
of production of increased export-market access or import competition, our paper is most
closely related to Koren and Csillag (2011), who study the ﬁrm-level link between capital
imports and wages. Our contribution is to embed a mechanism studied in these papers into
a quantitative general equilibrium trade model.
Our paper is most closely related to Parro (2010), who uses a similar model that incor-
porates capital-skill complementarity and the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect to study the impact
of trade on the skill premium.6 There are three main diﬀerences between these two papers.
First, we abstract from the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect. Second, we provide a simple expression
for the elasticity of a country’s skill premium with respect to each sector’s domestic produc-
tivity and domestic expenditure share, which does not depend on changes in trade costs,
foreign productivities, foreign labor endowments, or trade shares in other countries. Third,
the counterfactuals that we perform are diﬀerent: whereas we study the overall impact of
given changes in trade patterns on the skill premium by exploiting the simple structure of the
equilibrium of the model, Parro studies the impact of changing worldwide trade costs and
technologies on the skill premium by estimating changes in trade costs and technologies.7
2 The Model
Overview: We consider a world economy featuring  countries, indexed by  =1 .
Within each country, a representative household acquires utility from consumption of man-
ufactured goods and services. Each country is endowed with  and  eﬃciency units of
6For an earlier theoretical treatment of trade in skill-complementary capital in a neo-classical growth
model, see Stokey (1996).
7Another related paper is Burstein and Vogel (2010), which studies the impact of international trade and
multinational production on the skill premium, with special emphasis on the U.S., arising from two mecha-
nisms from which we abstract: () the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect and () within-sector factor reallocation in
the presence of skill-biased productivity.
3skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Heterogeneous producers of intermediate goods use
labor in combination with capital equipment, capital structures, and intermediate inputs.
To incorporate capital-skill complementarity, we allow for the elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled labor and capital equipment to diﬀer from that between unskilled labor and
equipment.
Producers diﬀer in terms of productivity and the sector in which they produce. There
are three sectors, indexed by : () a manufacturing sector,  = ,w h o s eﬁrms produce
tradable goods that are used for consumption and as intermediate inputs; () a service sector,
 = ,w h o s eﬁrms produce non-tradable goods that are used for consumption, intermediate
inputs, and investment in structures; and () a capital equipment sector,  = ,w h o s eﬁrms
produce tradable goods that are used for investment in capital equipment. Tradable goods
are subject to variable iceberg international trade costs. All labor and goods markets are
perfectly competitive. To simplify the notation, but without loss of generality for our results
on the impact of trade on the skill premium, we abstract from trend-growth in sector-speciﬁc
or factor-speciﬁc productivities.











where  () and  () denote consumption of manufactured goods and services, respec-
tively, ()is a concave sub-utility function deﬁned over aggregate consumption,  ∈ [01]
is the share of manufactured goods in consumption, and  ∈ (01) is the discount rate.
The household’s budget constraint equates consumption and investment expenditures (in-
vestment is discussed below) with labor income, payments to capital, and the value of net
exports. Given that our steady-state results do not depend on the value of the trade balance,
we do not make assumptions on the availability of international ﬁnancial assets. Given that
we focus our attention on steady-state equilibria, in what follows we mostly abstract from
time subscripts.
Sectoral output:S e c t o r uses a continuum of intermediate goods, each indexed by  ∈
[01], according to a CES production function with country- and sector-speciﬁc elasticity of








where  () is consumption of intermediate good () in country .E a c h i n t e r m e d i a t e
4good () is potentially produced in every country.
Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption,  (),a n di n t e r -
mediate inputs,  ():
 ()= ()+ ().( 2 )
Output from the service sector can be used for consumption,  (), intermediate inputs,
 (), and structures investment,  ():
 ()= ()+ ()+ ().( 3 )
Output from the equipment sector is used only for equipment investment,  ():
 ()= ().( 4 )
The aggregate law of motion of structures and equipment is
+1 ()=[ 1−  ()] ()+ (),f o r = ,
where we have re-introduced time subscripts to indicate the dynamics, and where  () ∈
(01) is the depreciation rate of capital of type  =  in country .
Production of intermediate goods: All producers of intermediate good () in country
 produce according to the following constant returns to scale production function:




































Producers combine intermediate inputs (of services, , and manufactured goods,  )w i t h
structures, , capital equipment, , unskilled labor, , and skilled labor .T h e s h a r eo f
v a l u ea d d e di ng r o s so u t p u ti sg i v e nb y. As discussed in more detail below, the parameters
 and  determine the elasticities of substitution between capital equipment, unskilled labor,
and skilled labor. A low value of  relative to  implies that capital equipment is less
substitutable with skilled labor than with unskilled labor. In particular, when the
production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity.
Productivity of all country  producers in () is given by the product of a country-
sector-speciﬁct e r m , (), shared by all sector  producers in country ,a n dac o u n t r y -
intermediate-good-speciﬁc productivity,  (),s h a r e db ya l l() intermediate good pro-
5ducers in country . The country-intermediate-good-speciﬁc productivity is equal to  ()=
−,w h e r e is an  random variable that is exponentially distributed with mean and
variance 1. A higher value of  increases the dispersion of productivities across producers
within sector .
The production function (5) extends that in KORV to include () intermediate inputs; ()
diﬀerences in productivities across sectors, as in a standard Ricardian model, so that coun-
tries can have sectoral comparative advantages; and () exponentially distributed country-
intermediate-good-speciﬁc productivities within a sector, as in EK, so that our multi-country
framework remains tractable.
International trade: Delivering a unit of intermediate good () from country  to country
 requires producing  () ≥ 1 units of that good in country ,w h e r e ()=1 .W ea s s u m e
that services are not tradable, so that  () is inﬁnite for all  6= .
Equilibrium: Producers hire unskilled and skilled labor at wages  and , respectively,
and rent structures and capital equipment at rental rates  and , respectively. The skill
premium in country  is deﬁned as . To construct prices, it is useful to deﬁne the unit
cost of producers of intermediate good () producing in country  and selling in country





Here,  i st h eu n i tc o s to fp r o d u c t i o nf o rt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e to fap r o d u c e ro fa n yi n t e r m e -






















where  is a constant, and  () is the aggregate price of output in sector .8
The price of intermediate good () in country  is:
 ()=m i n

{ ()},
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tg o o d() is perfectly substitutable across all potential
source countries that can supply the good to country . The aggregate price of sector 
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The share of country ’s expenditure in sector  that is allocated to goods from country










where I I  () is an indicator variable that equals one if country  purchases intermediate
good () from country , and equals zero otherwise. The domestic expenditure share is
given by  (). Using the assumption of exponentially distributed productivities, one can
















In the following sections, we use Equation (6) to solve analytically for the change in the skill
premium between any two steady states.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities such that all markets clear.
Each producer must satisfy worldwide demand for its output. Sectoral output must satisfy
the resource constraints (2), (3),a n d(4). The demand for unskilled and skilled labor across
producers must equal the endowments  and , respectively. The demand for intermedi-
ate inputs of services and manufacturing must equal  () and  (), respectively. The
demand for structures and capital equipment across producers must equal their supplies
 () and  (). The supplies of each type of capital must be consistent with the house-
hold’s optimal investment decisions. The household’s budget constraints must be satisﬁed.
A steady-state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all variables remain constant over time.
We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in Appendix A.
3A n a l y t i c R e s u l t s
In this section, we examine the central forces that shape changes in the skill premium in our
model.
73.1 The Skill Premium
Cost minimization implies that producers set the ratio of the marginal product of skilled labor
to unskilled labor equal to the skill premium. Equation (5) and the fact that producers in

































From equation (7), changes in country ’s skill premium are fully determined by changes
in country ’s endowments of skilled and unskilled labor, and changes in its stock of capital
equipment. An increase in unskilled labor relative to skilled labor increases the skill premium
with an elasticity of 1. An increase in capital equipment relative to skilled labor increases
the skill premium if and only if (that is, if skilled labor is more complementary with
capital equipment than is unskilled labor). This second component captures the capital-skill
complementarity eﬀect on the skill premium.
Of course, the stock of capital equipment,  (), is endogenous, and changes in  ()
potentially depend on changes in bilateral trade costs (between each pair of countries and
in each sector), changes in each country-sector-speciﬁc productivity, and changes in labor
endowments in each country. We can show, however, that there is a small set of suﬃcient
statistics that fully determine the equilibrium change in the stock of capital equipment and
the skill premium across steady-states. Appendix A presents a set of ﬁve equations from
which the steady-state change in the stock of capital equipment and the skill premium can
be calculated for any country .
For given values of the elasticities of substitution ( and ), the dispersion of productiv-
ities , and factor shares in the initial equilibrium, the change in country ’s skill premium
depends only on: () changes in domestic expenditure shares,  () for all ; () changes
in domestic technologies,  () for all ;a n d() changes in domestic endowments,  and
. Importantly, conditional on ()−(), changes in trade costs, changes in other countries’
technologies and endowments, and changes in all other trade shares do not aﬀect the change
in country ’s skill premium. That is, international trade, foreign technologies, and foreign
endowments only aﬀect country ’s skill premium through  ().M o r e o v e r , f o r a g i v e n
change in domestic expenditure shares  (), we do not need to compute the multi-country
general equilibrium model to calculate the change in country ’s skill premium.
Incorporating diﬀerences in factor intensities across sectors:I n A p p e n d i x C w e
brieﬂy discuss an extension of our basic environment that relaxes our assumption that factor
intensities are common across sectors. In particular, we allow for the parameters of the
8production function {} to all vary across sectors. We show that changes in a
country’s skill premium are not only determined by changes in domestic productivities, do-
mestic labor endowments, and domestic expenditure shares–as in our baseline model–but
also by changes in the factor-content of trade (i.e., the amount of each factor embodied in a
country’s net exports).9 This extended model thus embeds the standard Stolper-Samuelson
eﬀect, through which international trade raises the relative return of the factor used inten-
sively in the comparative advantage sector. We show, however, that conditional on observ-
ing changes in domestic productivities, domestic labor endowments, domestic expenditure
shares, and the factor-content of trade in country , one can still calculate changes in country
’s skill premium without actually computing the multi-country general equilibrium model.
3.2 First-Order Approximation
To better understand the role of changes in () domestic expenditure shares, () domestic
technologies, and () domestic endowments in shaping changes in the skill premium, we
log-linearize the steady-state equilibrium equations. In Appendix B we show that the change
in the skill premium is, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, given by



















b  () − b  ()
i
,( 8 )
where variables with hats denote log diﬀerences, 

 denotes the steady-state ratio of skilled
labor payments to capital equipment payments, and 

 denotes the steady-state ratio of un-










 +  +  ()
.
The elasticity of the skill premium with respect to a change in
h
b  () − b  ()
i
is given









9See Burstein and Vogel (2011) for a discussion of the factor content of trade in a general class of trade
models.






(1−) if  = 
(1−)(1−)
(1−) if  = 
1 if  = 
(10)
is a function of production function parameters and varies across sectors.
Decomposing changes in the skill premium:E q u a t i o n (8) decomposes the change
in the skill premium into four components. The ﬁrst component depends on the growth of
unskilled labor relative to skilled labor and captures the relative supply eﬀect already present
in equation (7). All else equal, an increase in the relative supply of skills reduces the skill















The second, third, and fourth components ( = , ,a n d) are all contained in the
second term of equation (8). Each component depends on changes in sector ’s productivity
and domestic expenditure share and captures the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect. All
else equal, an increase in
h
b  () − b  ()
i
raises the skill premium with an elasticity of
Θκ ().I f  ,s ot h a tΘ  0, then an increase in the supply of capital equipment
relative to skilled labor increases the skill premium, as shown in equation (7). Here, we
describe why an increase in b  () − b  () for all  tends to raise  (), and hence the
skill premium.
Intuitively, country ’s stock of equipment rises either through increased domestic produc-
tion or increased imports of equipment. All else equal, country  produces more equipment
as  () rises, and imports more equipment as () falls.
Country ’s supply of equipment also rises with an increase in b  () − b  (),f o r
 = . Intuitively, in equilibrium  () and  () rise with b  ()−b  () for  = 
and  = , respectively, for the same reason that  () rises with b  () − b  ().
Because  () and  () are used as inputs in the production of equipment, the stock of
equipment rises as well. Moreover, the stock of capital equipment increases with b  () even
if services are not used as intermediate inputs, i.e., even if  =0 , because structures are
used directly as an input in production, if   0.
The elasticity of the skill premium:E q u a t i o n(8) provides the elasticity of a country’s
skill premium with respect to each of its sectoral productivities, Θκ (),a n de a c ho fi t s
domestic sectoral expenditure shares, −Θκ (). These elasticities have clear economic
interpretations that highlight the roles played by diﬀerent model parameters and they allow
us to conduct sensitivity analyses analytically.
A higher value of within-sector technological dispersion, , tends to magnify the impact
10of changes in trade shares on the skill premium. This follows from the fact that for a
given domestic expenditure share in the equipment sector (as an example), the increase in
the stock of equipment generated by trade is greater for higher values of .I n t u i t i v e l y ,
when productivity dispersion rises, the cost diﬀerential between imported varieties and the
domestic varieties they replace becomes greater, so that the same reduction in the domestic
expenditure share leads to a greater increase in the stock of equipment.
Similarly, a higher value of the elasticity Θκ () tends to magnify the impact of changes
in b  () − b  () on the skill premium. A higher value of Θ corresponds to stronger
capital-skill complementarity. Inspecting equation (10),i ti sa p p a r e n tt h a ts e c t o r st h a ta r e
more important in the production of capital equipment have a higher value of κ (),a n d
hence have a higher elasticity of the skill premium with respect to b  ()−b  (). Perhaps
surprisingly, the sum of the elasticities of manufacturing and services can potentially be
larger than that of equipment. Intuitively, this is more likely to occur when manufacturing
and services play a larger role in the production of equipment, which occurs if the share of
intermediate inputs in production is high (i.e., if  is low) and if the share of services in
value added is high (i.e., if  is high). Note that the equipment stock and the skill premium
rise if there is growth in technology and trade in manufacturing, equipment, or services–
regardless of the sector in which growth is greatest–whereas the price of equipment relative
to consumption falls if technological and trade growth are relatively larger in the equipment
sector:
b  () − b  ()= b  () − b  ()+b  () − b  ().
Hence, an increase in the stock of equipment is not necessarily accompanied by a decline in
the relative price of equipment to consumption goods, and vice versa.
Summary: We summarize the previous results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, the skill premium in country  is given by equation (7),
and the change in the skill premium in country  across two steady-states is, to a ﬁrst-order
approximation, given by equation (8).
4 Quantitative Results
In this section we use our model to quantify the impact of changing trade ﬂows on the skill
premium in multiple countries. We conduct two counterfactuals. In the ﬁrst, we determine
how much each country’s skill premium would change if it were moved to autarky because
of increases in trade costs. In the second, we determine the impact of changes in observed
trade ﬂows on each country’s skill premium.
11Through these counterfactuals, we are interested in addressing the extent to which coun-
tries may import skill-biased technology and a rise in the skill premium. We are not directly
concerned with whether a change in trade patterns is driven by changing technologies or by
changing trade costs. Hence, we take as given changing trade ﬂows in the second counter-
factual, without determining their underlying causes.
These counterfactuals exploit the simple structure of our model, which allows us to
conduct these exercises country-by-country because the impact of changes in any foreign
technology, foreign factor endowment, or trade cost is transmitted only through changes in
domestic expenditure shares, which we take as given. Hence, we are able to conduct each
counterfactual without computing the full multi-country general equilibrium.
While we solve for exact changes in the skill premium, using the system of equations
provided in Appendix A, the intuition for our results all derive from equation (8),w h i c h
provides a ﬁrst-order approximation to changes in the skill premium. We replicate these two
counterfactuals using only equation (8), and show that this approximation is quite accurate.
To conduct our counterfactuals we need information on domestic expenditure shares,
 (), and we need to parameterize our model. In what follows, we ﬁrst describe how we
construct domestic expenditure shares and how we parameterize the model. Further details
are provided in Appendix D. Finally, we present the quantitative results.
4.1 Domestic Expenditure Shares
To construct domestic expenditure shares,  () and  (),w eu s et r a d ea n dp r o d u c -
tion data and compute expenditures as the diﬀerence between gross output and net exports.
Trade data comes from Feenstra et. al. (2005), which contains data by commodity, dis-
aggregated at the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) level, for the
1962-2000 period. For gross output data, we use the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database,
which covers the 1963-2007 period and is arranged at the 2-digit level of the third revision
of the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC Rev. 3).
We follow Eaton and Kortum (2001), who group manufactured commodities into equip-
ment goods and other manufacturing goods using input-output tables and capital ﬂows tables
of domestic transactions (OECD, 1996) for the three major capital goods producers (Ger-
many, Japan, and the US). For trade data, we match 4 digit SITC codes to a set of industry
codes used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Following Eaton and Kortum, we
deﬁne equipment trade as the sum of BEA industry codes 20-27 and 33.
For gross output data, Eaton and Kortum identify three ISIC Rev. 2 industries as
equipment producers: non-electrical equipment, electrical equipment, and instruments. We
12deﬁne equipment producers as the ISIC Rev. 3 industries that most closely correspond to the
ISIC Rev. 2 industries identiﬁed by Eaton and Kortum.10 In particular, we deﬁne equipment
commodities to be the sum of ISIC Rev. 3 codes 29-33.
After combining these datasets, we are left with 53 countries for which both data on
trade and output is available until at least 1995. For each country in our sample, our
counterfactuals are based on the ﬁrst and last year with available data. Importantly, we do
not require a balanced panel because we do not need data on changes in any country  6= 
when solving for the change in the skill premium in country  in our counterfactuals.
We report the resulting domestic expenditure shares in Table 2. Two features are striking
from the table. First, as noticed by Eaton and Kortum (2001), most countries import a
signiﬁcant fraction of their capital equipment. For the median country in our sample, the
import share of equipment in the year 2000 is roughly 1 − 025 = 075,m o r et h a nt w i c e
as large as the import share for other manufactured goods. Note that these import shares
are large for countries at diﬀerent stages of the development process, including developed
countries such as Canada and the UK. Second, most countries experienced sizable increases
in their import shares over our sample period, especially in the equipment sector. A notable
exception are the poorest countries in the sample, which were already importing almost all
of their equipment at the beginning of the sample. The median values across countries for
the changes in the domestic expenditure shares in equipment and manufacturing, b  () and
b  (),a r e−03 and −015, respectively.
The fact that  () tends to be lower in developing countries might suggest that the
relative price level of equipment is higher in these countries; see e.g. Eaton and Kortum
(2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007). In our model, this relative price depends on a com-
bination of trade costs and productivities in each country. Since our parameterization does
not separately identify trade costs and productivities in each country, our paper is silent on
our model’s implications for these relative prices.11
4.2 Parameterization
By inspecting the set of equations that determines the change in the skill premium in our
counterfactuals (described in Appendix A) and in the log-linearized equation (8),t h ep a r a -
meters that we must choose are those that determine the elasticities of substitution between
capital equipment, unskilled labor, and skilled labor,  and ; the within-sector dispersion of
10UNIDO discontinued its Industrial Statistics Database using ISIC Rev. 2.
11Waugh (2010) shows that quantitative Ricardian models are consistent with observed diﬀerences across
countries in the level of tradeable goods prices if one allows for asymmetric trade costs (e.g.  () 6=  ()),
as we do in this paper.
13productivity, ; the share of value added in production, ; the share of services in interme-
diate inputs, ; and the share of structures in value added, . In addition, we must choose




 (which, given other parameters values,
determine  and ). These parameters determine jointly the elasticity of the skill premium
with respect to trade shares, given by Θκ () in equation (8). We assume that all of the
above parameters are common across countries and sectors. We now provide an overview of
our baseline procedure, the results of which are summarized in Table 1.
Baseline parameterization:W es e t =0 2 for all . This parameter, which controls
the within-sector dispersion of productivity, plays a central role in quantitative trade models
because it determines the elasticity of imports with respect to trade costs in equilibrium,
as can be seen in equation (6). Our choice of  =0 2 implies an elasticity of 5,w h i c hi s
within the range of elasticities estimated in the trade literature; see, e.g., Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004),
Donaldson (2010), Simonovska and Waugh (2011), and Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer
(Forthcoming).
We pick , , , 
, 
,  and  to match certain features of US data between 1963 and
2000. We calibrate the share of value added in gross output, , and the share of services
in intermediate inputs, , using US Input-Output tables for the year 2000 from the OECD
Input-Output database.12 We calibrate , 
,a n d
 to match observed factor shares, which
are obtained as follows. We calculate the labor share in value added from NIPA as the ratio
of compensation for employees to value added less taxes, in the corporate and non-corporate
business sector. We disaggregate labor payments into skilled and unskilled labor using data
on quantities and prices of skilled and unskilled labor from Polgreen and Silos (2008), who
use detailed CPS data. We disaggregate capital payments into structures and equipment
using data on the value of capital stocks and, since rental rates are not directly observable,
using the steady-state Euler equations of our model for the accumulation of each type of
capital, where a time period represents a year (further details are provided in Appendix D).
We set , 
,a n d
 to equal the respective relative factor shares on average between 1963
and 2000.13 This procedure implies  =0 1, 
 =0 53,a n d
 =1 04.14
12These shares were  =0 54,a n d =0 6 in 2000.
13Factor shares 
 and 
 in the U.S. changed considerably in our time period (e.g. the payments to
capital equipment rise over time relative to the payments to skilled labor). If we calibrated the model to
the initial share levels in 1963, then the elasticity of the skill premium to trade ﬂows would be signiﬁcantly
larger than the one in our baseline parameterization.
14We assume that factor shares are identical across countries because of data limitations only. If, contrary
to our assumption, developing countries have lower equipment shares (or lower skill shares), then Θ would be
lower (higher) in developing countries. Our assumption that the labor share is not systematically correlated
with a country’s level of development is consistent with evidence in Gollin (2002). In our model the labor
share changes in response to the changes in trade shares we feed in from the data, but quantitatively these
14The two ﬁnal, and key parameters whose values we need to pick are  and .W ep u r s u e
several strategies to parameterize these. In our baseline parameterization, we calibrate  and
 so that our model reproduces the observed cumulative changes in factor shares and the skill
premium in the US between 1963 and 2000, given the observed changes in the supplies of
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where variables with hats denote log diﬀerences between 1963 and 2000. Equation (11)
is obtained by log-diﬀerentiating the producers’ ﬁrst-order condition for capital equipment
relative to skilled labor. Equation (12) is obtained by log-diﬀerentiating equation (7).I n
solving for  and , we use data on changes in the skill premium and on the stocks of
(quality adjusted) capital equipment, skilled labor and unskilled labor from Polgreen and
Silos (2008). This procedure implies  =0 63 and  =1 56.15
With these parameters, the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to b  ()−b  ()
in all countries is Θ =0 48 for equipment goods and Θκ ()=0 48∗037 = 018 for manu-
facturing goods, from equation (8).16 Together with our value of , this implies an elasticity
of the skill premium with respect to domestic expenditure shares Θκ () in equipment
and manufacturing of 010 and 004, respectively. Conducting sensitivity analyses of these
elasticities with respect to changes in parameter values is straightforward using equation (8).
Alternative parameterizations of  and : We pursue several alternative strategies to
parameterize  and . First, rather than calibrating  and  so that our model reproduces
the observed cumulative changes in factor shares and the skill premium in the US between
1963 and 2000, we estimate  and  via non-linear least squares, using equations (11) and
(12) and annual changes in factor shares and the skill premium in the US over the same time
period. We obtain  =0 66 and  =1 47,17 from which we obtain Θ =0 43.
changes are very small.
15In a multi-factor production function there are several alternative deﬁnitions of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between two factors. In our baseline parameterization, the Allen partial elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor is 156 while the direct partial elasticity of substitution between these
two factors is 104,u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions in Sato (1967).
16Using measures of changes in labor supplies and the skill premium from Acemoglu and Autor (2010) we
obtain Θ =0 49. If we parameterize our model using data from 1963 to 1992 as in KORV (as opposed to
1963-2000), we obtain Θ =0 50. Using the values of the elasticities  and  estimated in KORV we obtain
Θ =0 44.
17The standard errors on our estimates of  and  are 0016 and 0076, respectively.
15Second, we calibrate our model allowing for skill-biased technical change, an additional
mechanism to capital-skill complementarity that raises the skill premium over time. In
particular, we allow for exogenous trend growth in the productivity of the composite of
skilled labor and capital equipment relative to unskilled labor, extending the approach of
Katz and Murphy (1992). To do so we replace the term (1 − )
1 in equation (5) with
()(1− )
1,w h e r e()=e x p( ) and  denotes the annual trend.18 We adjust equa-
tion (12) accordingly. Feeding in a value of  =0 01, 002,o r003 into our calibration
procedure lowers Θ from 048 to 037, 027,o r018, respectively. The annual trend would
have to be as large as  =0 052 in order for capital-skill complementarity to be absent, i.e.
 ≥ .
Finally, to assess the degree of capital-skill complementarity in a developing country that
is a net importer of capital equipment, we re-parameterize  and  using data from Chile. We
use data on changes in the skill premium and on the stocks of capital equipment (not adjusted
for quality), skilled labor and unskilled labor for the time period 1974-2000 from Gallego
(Forthcoming). We adjust the stock of capital equipment using the same adjustment factor
as in the US, obtained from Polgreen and Silos (2008). We calculate the labor share in value
added as the ratio of the sum of compensation for employees and the surplus of enterprises
owned by households to the sum of compensation for employees and all operating surplus.19
Due to a lack of data on prices and on depreciation rates of capital equipment and structures,
we assume that the share of structures in value added is the same in Chile as in the US,
 =0 1. Since the Chilean data series is much more volatile than that in the US, our baseline
calibration is more sensitive to the two years chosen. Nevertheless, we always ﬁnd that there
is strong capital-skill complementarity. When we estimate  and  using annual changes in
factor shares and the skill premium in Chile over the years 1974-2000 we obtain  =0 53
and  =1 54.20 Together with the factor shares, these elasticities imply Θ =0 69.T h e
elasticities  and  are very close to those that we had calibrated and estimated using US
data, while Θ is larger due to diﬀerences in our measures of factor shares between Chile and
the US.
18As an example,  =0 01 implies that the skill premium rises by 1% per year, all else equal.
19We only have data on surplus of enterprises owned by households (Mixed Income) between 1996-2002.
We assume that in the years 1974-2000, the ratio of Mixed Income to Operating Surplus equals 0196,w h i c h
is the average for the 1996-2002 period. The source of this data is the National Accounts Oﬃcial Country
Data from the United Nations Statistics Division.
20The standard errors on our estimates of  and  are 0037 and 0202, respectively.
164.3 Results
We now quantify the impact of international trade, through capital-skill complementarity,
on the skill premium. We perform two counterfactual exercises using our baseline parame-
terization.
Counterfactual 1–Autarky: In our ﬁrst counterfactual, we ask: By how much would the
skill premium decrease if countries move from the trade levels observed in 2000 to autarky
in both equipment and manufacturing (by increasing trade costs to inﬁnity)? The numbers
from our counterfactuals are reported in Table 3. The results of our ﬁrst counterfactual
exercise are summarized in Figure 1, which plots the logarithmic change in the domestic
expenditure share in the equipment sector, moving from the year 2000 to autarky (x-axis),
and the logarithmic change in the skill premium (y-axis). The circles in Figure 1 show the
counterfactual decrease in the skill premium for each country. Absent international trade in
both capital equipment and manufactures, the skill premium would be roughly 5% smaller
in the US and 16% smaller in the median country. The decrease is much larger for countries
that are very dependent on imports of capital equipment, such as Cameroon and the Czech
Republic. On the other extreme, the decline in the skill premium is only 2% for Japan.
The line in Figure 1 shows the log change in the skill premium resulting from shutting
down trade in equipment goods, while keeping trade shares in the manufacturing sector
constant. All circles lie below the line because imports of manufactured goods contribute
to increase the stock of equipment and the skill premium. The distance between the circles
and the line is large for some countries such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Greece, which import
a substantial share of their manufacturing absorption. However, for most countries, trade
in equipment is signiﬁcantly more important than in manufacturing in driving the change
in the skill premium, because both the 2000 import share and the elasticity of the skill
premium with respect to a change in the import share are larger for equipment than for
manufacturing.
To assess the accuracy of our ﬁrst-order approximation of the change in the skill pre-
mium, Table 3 reports the change in the skill premium of going to autarky implied from
equation (8). Across our set of countries, the median and maximum diﬀerence between the
exact and approximated change in the skill premium are 1% and 9%, respectively (which
represent 7% and 19%, respectively, of the exact change in the skill premium). Of course,
the approximation error is larger for countries with lower domestic expenditures shares.
Counterfactual 2–Observed changes in trade shares: In our second counterfactual,
we ask: By how much would the skill premium change if countries move from the trade levels
observed in 2000, or the closest year with available information, to those observed at the
17beginning of the sample period? This counterfactual shows the impact of observed changes
in trade ﬂows on each country’s skill premium during our sample period. The results are
summarized in Figure 2, which displays the logarithmic change in the domestic expenditure
share in the equipment sector (x-axis) and the logarithmic change in the skill premium
(y-axis).
We ﬁnd that international trade tends to play an important role in shaping the skill
premium, but that its importance varies widely across countries in our sample depending on
the magnitude of the changes in the domestic expenditure shares in equipment and other
manufactured goods. While the counterfactual change in the skill premium is −6% for the
median country of our sample, and −5% for the US, the decline in the skill premium is
quite large in various developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and
Uruguay, and in some developed countries such as Canada and the UK.21 Note that for
countries in the northwest corner of Figure 2, domestic expenditure shares in the equipment
sector rose during our sample period, so that moving from the domestic expenditure shares
in equipment observed in 2000 to those in the base year contribute to increasing the skill
premium.
Once again, trade in equipment plays a more signiﬁcant role than trade in other man-
ufactured goods in shaping the change in skill premium. This is reﬂected by the relatively
small distance between the circles and the line in Figure 2.
Table 3 reports the approximate changes in the skill premium from equation (8).T h e
median and maximum diﬀerences between the exact and approximated changes in the skill
premium are only 03% and 4%, respectively (which represent 47% and 12%, respectively,
of the exact change in the skill premium). Overall, equation (8) is remarkably accurate.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we develop a theory of international trade in which capital embodies skill-biased
technology. We use the model to assess the extent to which international trade, by inducing
a rise in the stock of capital, increases the demand for skilled labor and, therefore, the skill
premium. We analytically provide simple suﬃcient statistics that determine the magnitude of
the rise in the skill premium from international trade. For given parameter values, changes in
21For some countries, these number are quite large when compared to the observed increase in the skill
premium over a similar time period. For example, the skill premium increased 22% in Canada between
1978-2006, 12% in the UK between 1978-2005, 20% in Argentina between 1992-1998, and 16% in Colombia
between 1986-1998; see Krueger et. al. (2010) and Goldberg and Pavnick (2007). For the U.S., the number
is not very large relative to the 25% rise in the composition-adjusted skill premium between 1963-2000; see
Acemoglu and Autor (2010).
18domestic expenditure shares fully summarize the eﬀects on the skill premium of all changes in
trade patterns, whether generated by changes in foreign technologies, domestic technologies,
or trade costs. Based on this logic, we perform a range of counterfactuals to assess the
quantitative importance of international trade on the rise in the skill premium. We ﬁnd
that international trade can have a substantial impact on the skill premium, especially in
countries that import a large fraction of their equipment.
In our quantitative analysis, we make three choices that deserve further discussion. First,
we focus on steady-state equilibria, abstracting from the transition dynamics of the skill pre-
mium as countries open up to trade and gradually accumulate capital; see e.g. Stokey
(1996). Second, we parameterize the degree of capital-skill complementarity to match ob-
served changes in aggregate factor shares and the skill premium in the US and in Chile.
An alternative approach would be to make use of micro-level evidence on the relationship
between skill intensity and capital intensity at the producer level. This would require ex-
tending the model to allow for heterogeneity in factor intensity across producers within a
country and sector.22 Third, we assume that the degree of capital-skill complementarity is
common across each type of equipment capital. If, however, diﬀerent types of equipment
exhibit diﬀerent degrees of capital-skill complementarity, then countries might choose to in-
vest in and import diﬀerent mixes of equipment depending on their relative endowment of
skilled to unskilled labor; see e.g. Caselli and Wilson (2004).23
While we focus on the implications of changes in trade patterns for the skill premium,
our framework can be applied to study the importance of skill-biased technical change as
well. In particular, by incorporating factor-speciﬁc technical change into our production
function, as we do in the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.2, we obtain an equation that
extends Tinbergen’s (1974, 1975) pioneering work–what Autor and Acemoglu (2010) call
the canonical model–to include the eﬀects on the skill premium not only of labor endowment
and skill-biased technical changes, but also of changes in the pattern of international trade.
Finally, in this paper we model the international transfer of skill-biased technology
through trade in capital goods. We abstract from other potentially important channels
by which technologies diﬀuse across countries, such as multinational production, see, e.g.,
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2010); migration,
see, e.g., Gandal, Hanson, and Slaughter (2004); or spillovers, see, e.g., Coe and Helpman
22Burstein and Vogel (2010) provide a related model in which producer productivity is positively correlated
with skill intensity. With this heterogeneity, one loses the tractable gravity structure of the model, even at
the sectoral level.
23Such an extension would have to be consistent with our ﬁnding that the extent of capital-skill com-
plementarity is similar in the US and Chile. Moreover, if imported capital exhibits a greater degree of
capital-skill complementarity than domestically produced capital, then trade will raise the skill premium.
19(1995) and Gancia, Müller, and Zilibotti (2010). We also abstract from endogenous skill-
biased technical change through innovation, see, e.g., Acemoglu (2003) and Bloom, Draca,
and Van Reenen (2011). Understanding the quantitative link between globalization and
inequality through these alternative channels remains an important area for future research.
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27Table 2: Domestic Expenditure Shares
Country Initial year (0) Final year (1) 0 () 1 () 0 () 1 ()
Argentina 1984 2000 0.77 0.37 0.95 0.83
Australia 1963 2000 0.74 0.19 0.87 0.70
Austria 1963 2000 0.54 0.16 0.79 0.47
Bangladesh 1972 1998 0.43 0.37 0.65 0.65
Brazil 1990 2000 0.87 0.64 0.95 0.89
Bulgaria 1980 2000 0.90 0.26 0.95 0.35
Cameroon 1970 2000 0.13 0.04 0.50 0.60
Canada 1963 2000 0.65 0.12 0.87 0.56
Chile 1963 2000 0.35 0.16 0.84 0.71
China 1977 2000 0.99 0.47 0.97 0.81
Colombia 1963 2000 0.44 0.21 0.88 0.76
Czech Rep 1995 2000 0.29 0.04 0.64 0.51
Denmark 1963 2000 0.54 0.23 0.56 0.46
Ecuador 1963 2000 0.02 0.10 0.68 0.78
Egypt 1964 1998 0.27 0.27 0.81 0.70
Finland 1963 2000 0.50 0.52 0.83 0.68
France 1963 2000 0.79 0.42 0.90 0.72
Germany 1991 2000 0.65 0.44 0.71 0.67
Greece 1963 1998 0.35 0.16 0.71 0.46
Guatemala 1968 1998 0.10 0.11 0.61 0.62
India 1963 1999 0.89 0.74 0.92 0.88
Iran 1963 2000 0.15 0.72 0.60 0.91
Israel 1963 2000 0.50 0.30 0.72 0.41
Italy 1967 2000 0.71 0.59 0.84 0.76
Japan 1963 2000 0.94 0.85 0.96 0.91
Kenya 1963 2000 0.09 0.12 0.54 0.80
Korea 1963 2000 0.46 0.53 0.80 0.84
28Table 2 (cont.): Domestic Expenditure Shares
Country Initial year (0) Final year (1) 0 () 1 () 0 () 1 ()
Kyrgyzstan 1992 2000 0.98 0.21 0.98 0.66
Latvia 1992 2000 0.64 0.06 0.76 0.36
Lithuania 1992 2000 0.75 0.16 0.87 0.52
Malawi 1965 2000 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.59
Nepal 1986 1996 0.14 0.19 0.79 0.68
Norway 1963 2000 0.43 0.24 0.68 0.57
Pakistan 1963 2000 0.15 0.36 0.63 0.72
Poland 1982 2000 0.93 0.35 0.97 0.57
Portugal 1963 2000 0.28 0.25 0.77 0.59
Romania 1985 2000 0.98 0.22 0.97 0.65
Russia 1996 2000 0.58 0.38 0.75 0.59
Slovakia 1993 2000 0.31 0.11 0.54 0.22
Slovenia 1992 2000 0.44 0.31 0.62 0.46
Spain 1963 2000 0.53 0.38 0.90 0.70
Sweden 1963 2000 0.67 0.33 0.78 0.64
Switz. 1986 2000 0.58 0.25 0.45 0.41
Macedna 1993 2000 0.47 0.38 0.61 0.43
Tanzania 1965 1999 0.08 0.11 0.59 0.56
Tunisia 1963 2000 0.20 0.21 0.54 0.63
Turkey 1963 2000 0.34 0.32 0.85 0.72
UK 1963 2000 0.90 0.27 0.89 0.67
USA 1963 2000 0.98 0.63 0.97 0.82
Ukraine 1992 2000 0.94 0.48 0.99 0.68
Uruguay 1968 2000 0.62 0.13 0.91 0.65
VietNam 1998 2000 0.19 0.32 0.29 0.53
Zimbabwe 1964 1996 0.92 0.54 0.99 0.79
29Table 3: Counterfactuals
Exact solution Approximation Exact solution Approximation
Aut. Actual Aut. Actual Aut. Actual Aut. Actual
Argentina -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 Kyrgyzstan -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
Australia -0.19 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 Latvia -0.36 -0.29 -0.31 -0.26
Austria -0.22 -0.14 -0.20 -0.13 Lithuania -0.22 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17
Bangladesh -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 Malawi -0.48 0.10 -0.39 0.11
Brazil -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 Nepal -0.19 0.02 -0.17 0.02
Bulgaria -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 Norway -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06
Cameroon -0.37 -0.10 -0.31 -0.09 Pakistan -0.12 0.09 -0.11 0.09
Canada -0.25 -0.19 -0.22 -0.17 Poland -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
Chile -0.20 -0.08 -0.19 -0.08 Portugal -0.16 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02
China -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 Romania -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
Colombia -0.17 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 Russia -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05
Czech Rep -0.39 -0.21 -0.33 -0.19 Slovakia -0.31 -0.14 -0.27 -0.13
Denmark -0.18 -0.09 -0.17 -0.09 Slovenia -0.15 -0.04 -0.14 -0.04
Ecuador -0.26 0.17 -0.23 0.18 Spain -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04
Egypt -0.15 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 Sweden -0.13 -0.08 -0.12 -0.07
Finland -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 Switz. -0.18 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08
France -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 Macedna -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.03
Germany -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 Tanzania -0.26 0.03 -0.23 0.03
Greece -0.23 -0.09 -0.20 -0.09 Tunisia -0.18 0.01 -0.17 0.01
Guatemala -0.25 0.01 -0.22 0.01 Turkey -0.13 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01
India -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 UK -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13
Iran -0.04 0.15 -0.04 0.16 USA -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Israel -0.16 -0.07 -0.15 -0.07 Ukraine -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Italy -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 Uruguay -0.23 -0.17 -0.21 -0.16
Japan -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 Viet Nam -0.14 0.07 -0.13 0.07
Kenya -0.23 0.04 -0.21 0.04 Zimbabwe -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
Korea -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.01
Note: Aut. refers to counterfactual of moving from 2000 trade levels to autarky. Actual refers to
counterfactual of moving from 2000 trade levels to start of sample trade levels. Exact refers to
exact solution, approximation refers to loglinear approximation in equation (8)
30A Solving for Changes in the Skill Premium
In this section, we show how to solve for the change in country ’s skill premium as a function
of changes in domestic expenditure shares,  ()’s, changes in domestic technologies,  ()’s;
and changes in domestic endowments,  and . We proceed in three steps. First, we derive
the marginal costs functions and equilibrium input demands. Then, we characterize the steady
state equilibrium. Finally, using the steady state equilibrium conditions, we derive the system of
equations that completely characterizes the change in country ’s skill premium.
A.1 Marginal Cost Functions and Intermediate Inputs Demands
We ﬁrst derive the formulas for the marginal cost functions and the intermediate input demands.
To simplify notation, we write the production function of () intermediate good producers as


































The unit cost of production for the domestic market of a producer with productivity  () ()=
















 (1−)1− , 2 =
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1−





















Here, 4, 3, 2,a n d1 denote the unit costs of the input bundles 4, 3, 2,a n d1 in
country .







Factors demanded in the production of intermediate good () in country  for goods sold in























4 ()=( 1− )
()()
4













and where I I  () is an indicator function that takes the value of one when country  supplies
country  with intermediate good () and is zero otherwise.
A.2 Steady State Equilibrium
We now use the above equations to characterize steady-state equilibrium aggregate variables. In






 () () ()
denote total revenue accruing to all country  producers across all sectors. Integrating factor
demands across producers, and adding across all destination countries  and sectors ,w eh a v e
equilibrium in factor markets,
 ()=Φ,( 1 3 )





¢−1 Φ,( 1 4 )








Φ,( 1 5 )








Φ,( 1 6 )
intermediate input markets,
 () ()= (1 − )Φ,( 1 7 )
 () ()=( 1 − )(1− )Φ.( 1 8 )
and goods markets,
 ()= ()+ (),( 1 9 )
 ()= ()+ ()+ () (),( 2 0 )
 ()= () (),( 2 1 )













32where  ()={Γ(1 +  [1 −  ()])}
1[1−()] and Γ is the Gamma function. Finally, the house-
hold optimality conditions in steady state are given by the Euler equations
1 =  / ()+1−  (),( 2 3 )
1 =  / ()+1−  (),( 2 4 )




 () (),( 2 5 )
and the budget constraint
 +  +  ()+ ()+ =  () ()+ () () () (26)
+ ()[ ()+ () ()]
where  denotes net exports. Equations (13) − (26) characterize the steady-state equilibrium.
A.3 Solving for Changes in the Skill Premium
We conclude this section by showing that we can solve for changes in country ’s skill premium



































































++() denote relative factor shares in the initial equilibrium.
W ep r o c e e di no r d e r .B ye q u a t i o n s(6) and (22),w eh a v e




and taking changes between the new and initial equilibrium gives
e  ()=e e  ()

.
e  ().( 3 2 )
Similarly, by equation (25),w eh a v e
e  = e  ().( 3 3 )














Expressing the previous equation in changes gives equation (28). In addition, expressing the deﬁ-
nition of 1 in changes gives equation (29).
To obtain the remaining two equations, (30) and (31), we express the remaining marginal cost
equations in changes:





e 4 = e  ()
 e  ()
1− (35)


















Letting  ()=1be the numeraire, equation (24) implies e  = e  ()=1 . Hence, equations (36)
and (37) imply equation (30). Finally, by equation (32) and  ()=1 ,w eh a v e
e  = e  ().( 3 8 )
By equations (34), (35),a n d(38),w eh a v e






e 4 = e  ()
1− =
n






The two previous equations imply (31). Hence, we can solve for changes in country ’s skill premium
using equations (27)-(31).
BP r o o f s
In this section, we prove Proposition 1.
B.1 Derivation of Equation (7)



































.( 4 0 )



















.( 4 1 )
From equations (40) and (41), we obtain equation (7).
B.2 Derivation of Equation (8)
We now derive our ﬁrst order approximation for the change in the skill premium. Let b  ≡ log(e ).
Using this notation, we express equations (27), (28),a n d(31) as
b  = b  () − b  ()+b  () (42)
b  −  b  =(  − ) b 1 −
³
b  − b 
´
.( 4 3 )
b 3 =
 +  − 

b  ()+
(1 − )(1− )

h
b  () − b  ()
i
(44)




















































b  − b 
´
,( 4 7 )



























































b  − b 
´
,( 4 8 )
35Equation (47) implies







































b  − b 
´¸
.( 5 0 )
By equations (49) and (50),w eh a v e
















b  − b 
´
(51)
Finally, by equations (42), (44),a n d(51),w eh a v ee q u a t i o n(8).
C Heterogeneous Sectors
In this section, we extend the model to allow for heterogeneous production functions across sectors.
In particular, we assume the production function is given by:



































where we have dropped country-speciﬁc subscripts, , from the production function parameters
to facilitate exposition. The unit cost of production–for supplying the domestic market–of a
















































36Integrating factor demands across producers, and adding across all destination countries  and





























































where Φ () ≡
P
  () () () denotes total revenue accruing to all country  producers in
sector .
We now express the above conditions in terms of the factor content of trade.D e ﬁne by 






 () (),( 5 2 )
where  () denotes the utilization of factor  in country  and sector ,a n dw h e r e () is the
ratio of county ’s net exports in sector  to country ’s total revenue in sector ,
 ()=
P
 [ () () () −  () () ()]
P
  () () ()
.( 5 3 )
By equations (52) and (53),w eh a v e

 =  ()
X
6=
[ () () () −  () () ()],( 5 4 )




























and in the factor markets as
 =
P
  () ()






























































=1∈J, { ()  ()}

=1, { ()  ()}

=1,a n d{ ()  ()}

=1
that characterizes the steady-state equilibrium and that depends only on the sectoral domestic
expenditure shares { ()}∈J, the sectoral domestic productivities { ()}∈J, the factor content





∈F, and the parameters
©
     
ª
∈J.
D Data and Parameterization
Domestic Expenditure Shares: For trade data, we deﬁne equipment trade as the sum of BEA
industry codes 20-27 and 33. These codes are: Farm and Garden Machinery; Construction, Mining,
etc.; Computer and Oﬃce Equipment; Other Nonelectric Machinery; Household Appliances; House-
hold Audio and Video, etc.; Electronic Components; Other Electrical Machinery; and Instruments
and Apparatus).
For gross output data, we deﬁne capital equipment goods as the sum of ISIC Rev. 3 codes
29-33. These codes are: Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of oﬃce,
accounting and computing machinery; Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.;
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus; and Manufacture
of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks.
Dissaggregating capital payments into structures and equipment: For a given share of
38payments to capital in value added, i.e.
 ()+ ()
 +  +  ()+ ()
,
the parameter  determines the ratio of payments to capital structures relative to the payments
to equipment capital, i.e.  ()[ ()].G i v e n t h e d i ﬃculty of measuring capital rental


















where  denotes the consumption-based real-interest rate and  () denotes the price of the ﬁnal
consumption good in year . Note that, in this calculation we allow for trends in relative prices (as
above, introducing growth into our model does not change our results on the impact of trade on
the skill premium).
To solve for the rental rates, we use data from NIPA for the 1963-2000 period. We deﬁne non-
residential equipment and software as the equipment sector , and non-residential structures as the
structure sector, .W et a k e+1 () () and +1 () () from NIPA’s price indices for
private investment (NIPA table 5.3.4). We use the GDP deﬂator from NIPA for +1 () ().
We construct the annual depreciation rates of equipment and structures,  () and  (),a st h e
ratio of the current-cost depreciation (NIPA ﬁxed assets table 4.4) to the current cost capital stock
(NIPA ﬁxed assets table 4.1) in these two sectors. We set the real interest rate  to 4%.
We use the 1963-2000 average of these variables and the Euler equations to obtain the relative
return for equipment and structures  ()[ ()]. We multiply this by the relative value
of the capital stocks [ () () () ()] to obtain  ()[ ()] We use the 1963-
2000 average current cost capital stock of non-residential equipment and non-residential structures
(NIPA ﬁx e da s s e t st a b l e4 . 1 )f o r () () and  () (). Finally, to compute the share of
payments to structures capital in value added, ,w eu s et h er e l a t i v ep a y m e n t st os t r u c t u r e sa n d
equipment and the share of payments to capital in value added (equal to one minus the average
labor share, as deﬁned in the body of the paper). We obtain a very similar value for  if we ﬁrst
calculate, year by year, the relative payments to equipment and structures and the share of capital,
and then average these over time.
39